334 1-40. Insurgents employ deep-seated strategic causes as well as temporary local causes, adding or deleting
335 them as circumstances demand. Leaders often use a bait-and-switch approach to draw in supporters, appealing initially to local grievances to lure followers into a broader movement. Without an attractive cause,
337 an insurgency might not be able to sustain itself. But a carefully chosen cause is a formidable and intangible asset that can provide a fledgling movement a long-term, concrete base of support. The ideal cause attracts the most people while alienating the fewest. It is one the counterinsurgent cannot undermine the insurgency by advocating. Insurgents must be able to fully identify themselves with the cause and those
341 attracted to it.
342 1-41. Potential insurgents can capitalize on a wealth of potential causes. Any country ruled by a small
343 group without broad popular participation provides a political cause for insurgents. Exploited or repressed
344 social groups—be they entire classes, ethnic groups, or small elites—may support larger causes in reaction
345 to their own, narrower grievances. Economic inequities can nurture revolutionary unrest, as can racial or
346 ethnic persecution. As previously noted, an efficient insurgent propaganda campaign can also turn an artficial problem into a real one.
348 1-42. A skillful counterinsurgent can deal a significant blow to an insurgency by appropriating its cause,
349 such as when the Philippine government adopted land reform to help defuse the Huk Rebellion in 1951. Insurgents often exploit multiple causes, making the counterinsurgents’ problems more acute. In the end, any
351 successful counterinsurgency expecting lasting results against a serious insurgency must address in some
352 way the underlying conditions that produced the revolutionary situation. These may be very different in
353 each local area, requiring a complex set of solutions.
354 1-43. As was noted earlier, insurgents now use communications technology, including the Internet, to link
355 with allied groups within and outside the country, joining in loose organizations with a common objective
356 but very different motivations. For many groups involved with the current radical Islamic insurgency, decrying the very globalization that allows them to coordinate their activities and achieve synergy is one of
358 their main causes. Thus, even though the old adage “all politics is local” remains applicable to modern insurgencies, they may have global dimensions.
335 them as circumstances demand. Leaders often use a bait-and-switch approach to draw in supporters, appealing initially to local grievances to lure followers into a broader movement. Without an attractive cause,
337 an insurgency might not be able to sustain itself. But a carefully chosen cause is a formidable and intangible asset that can provide a fledgling movement a long-term, concrete base of support. The ideal cause attracts the most people while alienating the fewest. It is one the counterinsurgent cannot undermine the insurgency by advocating. Insurgents must be able to fully identify themselves with the cause and those
341 attracted to it.
342 1-41. Potential insurgents can capitalize on a wealth of potential causes. Any country ruled by a small
343 group without broad popular participation provides a political cause for insurgents. Exploited or repressed
344 social groups—be they entire classes, ethnic groups, or small elites—may support larger causes in reaction
345 to their own, narrower grievances. Economic inequities can nurture revolutionary unrest, as can racial or
346 ethnic persecution. As previously noted, an efficient insurgent propaganda campaign can also turn an artficial problem into a real one.
348 1-42. A skillful counterinsurgent can deal a significant blow to an insurgency by appropriating its cause,
349 such as when the Philippine government adopted land reform to help defuse the Huk Rebellion in 1951. Insurgents often exploit multiple causes, making the counterinsurgents’ problems more acute. In the end, any
351 successful counterinsurgency expecting lasting results against a serious insurgency must address in some
352 way the underlying conditions that produced the revolutionary situation. These may be very different in
353 each local area, requiring a complex set of solutions.
354 1-43. As was noted earlier, insurgents now use communications technology, including the Internet, to link
355 with allied groups within and outside the country, joining in loose organizations with a common objective
356 but very different motivations. For many groups involved with the current radical Islamic insurgency, decrying the very globalization that allows them to coordinate their activities and achieve synergy is one of
358 their main causes. Thus, even though the old adage “all politics is local” remains applicable to modern insurgencies, they may have global dimensions.
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